Duquesne Law Review
Volume 51

Number 1

Article 9

2012

Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege in Business Negotiations:
Would the Application of the Subject-Matter Waiver Doctrine
Really Drive Attorneys from the Bargaining Table?
Edward J. Imwinkelried

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege in Business Negotiations: Would the
Application of the Subject-Matter Waiver Doctrine Really Drive Attorneys from the Bargaining Table?, 51
Duq. L. Rev. 167 (2012).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol51/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship
Collection.

Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege in Business
Negotiations: Would the Application of the SubjectMatter Waiver Doctrine Really Drive Attorneys
from the Bargaining Table?
EdwardJ. Imwinkelried*
[A] rule that would allow broad subject matter waivers to be
implied from such communications would provide perverse incentives: parties would leave attorneys out of commercial negotiations for fear that their inclusion would later force
wholesale disclosure of confidential information.
-XYZ Corporationv. United States (In re Keeper of the Records),
348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoted in Center Partners,Ltd. v.
Growth Head GP, LLC, No. 113107, 2012 1l. LEXIS 1525 (Ill.
Nov. 29, 2012)).
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Privilege law is arguably the most important doctrinal area in
the law of evidence. Most evidentiary doctrines relate primarily to
the courts' institutional concerns about the reliability of the evidence that the trier of fact relies on.' In contrast, privileges impact "extrinsic social policy."2 During the 1973 congressional hearings on the then draft Federal Rules of Evidence, former United
States Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg distinguished privilege doctrine from other evidentiary rules:
[Privilege law] is the concern of the public at large. [Privileges] involve the relations between husband and wife. As the
Supreme Court [has] suggested . . . , the marital privilege

constitutes the basis of the family relation and antedates even
the adoption of our Constitution. They involve the relations
between lawyer and client, a privilege that long antedates the

1. See generally Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. Rev. 227
(1988).
2. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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adoption of our Constitution. They relate to the fundamental
rights of citizens.3
It is no accident that since the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975, the Supreme Court has handed down more decisions relating to privilege law than concerning any other part of
the FederalRules.4
When a litigant raises a privilege objection to a question about a
pretrial communication, several issues can arise. The threshold
question is whether there is a prima facie case that the privilege
attached to the communication. The judge must grapple with
such questions as whether the litigant raising the objection has
standing to assert the privilege5 and whether the communication
was confidential.' However, even when the objector can establish
a prima facie case, the party seeking discovery can prevail. To
begin with, the party may be able to invoke a special exception to
the scope of the privilege.' For example, the attorney-client privilege yields if the party can demonstrate that the client sought the
attorney's advice to enable the client to commit a future crime or
fraud.' Alternatively, the party can overcome the privilege by
demonstrating that the privilege has been waived.' One of the
leading treatises on privilege law asserts that "[n]o area of the law
of privilege is more fraught with complexity than the area of waivers." 0
In recent years, the waiver issue has attracted a good deal of attention. One waiver issue has particularly caught Congress' eye.
As individuals and businesses increasingly began to store their
information on computers, electronic discovery became a major
battleground in modern litigation. For example, in the ongoing
litigation between Viacom and YouTube, the judge ordered the
production of twelve terabytes of data, which is "the ... equivalent
3. Rules of Evidence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,93th Cong. 142, 143-44 (1973) (testimony of Hon. Arthur
H. Goldberg).
4. Molly Rebecca Bryson, Protecting Confidential Communications Between a Psychotherapistand Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 963 (1997).
5.

1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES

§ 6.5

(2d ed. 2009).
6. Id. § 6.8.

7. 2 id. § 6.13.
8.
9.

United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989).
2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.12.

10. 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 636 (5th ed. 2007).
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of the entire Library of Congress . . . [and] then some."n Given the
size of these production events, it was inevitable that parties
would sometimes inadvertently produce privileged information.
Even with the benefit of computerized search techniques, screening millions of pages to identify privileged information is difficult.
Consequently, a sharp dispute arose as to whether inadvertent
production effected a waiver.12 Some courts took the strict view
that even if the party exercised reasonable diligence to prevent
such inadvertent disclosure, the revelation resulted in a waiver.
Fearing a waiver, many companies began spending enormous
sums of money on pre-production privilege reviews. For instance,
during a Department of Justice antitrust investigation, Verizon
Communications, Inc. spent $13.5 million on a privilege review.13
Congress became so concerned that in 2008 it intervened and enacted new Federal Rule of Evidence 502.1' As a general proposition, Rule 502(b) announces that inadvertent production does not
effect a waiver.15 The Judicial Conference's September 26, 2007
letter to Congress explained that the "skyrocketing" costs of privilege review necessitated legislative intervention."
While Rule 502 relates to waiver in one important pretrial setting, discovery, another controversy has arisen with respect to another pretrial setting, commercial negotiations. Suppose that in
order to strengthen its argument during business negotiations, a
party discloses information protected by the attorney-client privilege. For example, a party might be bargaining to have a certain
provision included in the contract. The party might tell the opposing party that it needs that provision in order to obtain the tax
benefits that make it economically feasible for the party to enter
into the bargain. To bolster its argument, the party might show
the other party an opinion letter from the party's attorney. Generally, when a party intentionally discloses privileged information,
the scope of the waiver includes not only the disclosed information
11. Joe Dysart, The Trouble with Terabytes, As Bulging Client Data Heads for the
Cloud, Law FirmsReady for a Storm, 97 A.B.A. J. 32 (Apr. 2011).
12. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, §6.12.4.
13. Alvin F. Lindsay, New Rule 502 to Protect Against Privilege Waiver, NAVL L.J.,
Aug. 25, 2008, at S2.
14. Edward J. lmwinkelried, A CrashCourse in Rule 502, TRIAL, July 2010, at 38.
15. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
16. Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chairman, Judicial Conference of the United States
Committee of Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, and Arlen
Specter, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 26, 2007), available
at http//federalevidence.com/pdf/2008/06-June/HillLetter EV_502on9-26-07.pdf; see also
FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note ("the burdensome costs of privilege review").
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but also other privileged information dealing with the same subject matter.17 However, a dispute has arisen as to whether the
general rule should extend to disclosures during pretrial business
negotiations. As Part I of this article notes, there is now a threeway split of authority over that question. Some courts have refused to apply the normal subject-matter waiver rule for the stated reason that the extension of the rule to this context creates an
intolerable risk of "in effect destroy[ing] the privilege whenever a
party enters into negotiations, doing violence .. . to the policy of

free disclosure between attorney and client."" These courts fear
that the application of the subject-matter waiver rule to negotiations will create a "perverse incentive[] . . . [to] leave attorneys out

of commercial negotiations for fear that their inclusion would later
force wholesale disclosure of confidential information."19
The thesis of this article is that those fears are misguided and
rest on misconceptions about the fundamental conception of
"communication" in privilege law. The first part of this article
describes the current split of authority over the issue of the application of the subject-matter waiver rule to business negotiations.
The second part of the article critically evaluates the merits of the
different positions the courts have taken on the issue. Furthermore, the second part addresses and ultimately rejects several
secondary arguments against applying the subject-matter waiver
rule to this setting. However, the primary focus of part two is on
the contention that the extension of the rule to business negotiations will banish attorneys from the negotiating table. The article
concludes that, quite to the contrary, the extension of the subjectmatter waiver rule to commercial negotiations will reinforce the
important, legitimate role that attorneys can play in such negotiations.

17. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.12.7.
18. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 n.2 (D. Del. 1968).
19. XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.
2003).
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I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE
APPLICATION OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER WAIVER RULE TO BUSINESS
NEGOTIATIONS

A.

The TraditionalSubject-Matter Waiver Rule: The Scope of
Any Intentional Waiver Not Only Includes the Disclosed
Communicationsbut also Extends to Other Communications
Relevant to the Same Subject Matter

At common law, the general rule is that when a privilege holder
discloses a privileged communication to someone outside the circle
of confidence, the disclosure effects a waiver that includes not only
the disclosed information but other privileged communications
relevant to the same subject matter.2 0 To be sure, courts differ in
how broadly they interpret the expression "subject matter."2 The
early cases tended to interpret the expression broadly.2 2 However,
the recent trend has been to construe the expression narrowly23
and limit the breadth of the waiver to the same specific subject
matter.24
The proponents of the subject-matter waiver rule have advanced
various justifications for the rule. Dean Wigmore favored extending the scope of the waiver to other communications relevant to
the subject matter.2 5 His position was expectable. Wigmore sympathized with the views of the great English utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham,26 who attacked privileges as obstructions
to the search for truth.27 Of course, the broader the scope of the
waiver, the less the obstructive effect of the privilege. Other proponents relied on the far more theoretical argument that a privilege is indivisible and that if the holder surrendered the protection
for one privileged communication, the surrender necessarily ap-

20. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 584; Alan J. Martin, Demetrios G. Metropoulos & Nicole
J. Highland, Putting Attorneys on the Witness Stand and Their Advice at Issue: The Perils
of Selective Waiver of Privilege, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
429, 447 (5th ed. 2012).
21. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 584-85; Martin et al., supra note 20, at 448.
22. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 591.
23. Martin et al., supra note 20, at 448.
24. PAUL R. RICE, AITORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 9.81 n.4 (2d
ed. 2011), available at Westlaw ACPRIV-FED (citing In re United Mine Workers of Am.
Emp. Benefits Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 309 n.2 (D. D.C. 1994)).
25. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 585.
26. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 3.1.
27. Id. § 2.5.
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plied to all related communications.2 8 Still others relied on a twopronged fairness argument. At least when the holder intentionally waived, there was no element of unfairness to the holder.2 9
Moreover, if the scope of the waiver did not extend to other related
communications, the holder could unfairly disadvantage an opponent by using the privilege as both a sword and a shield.3 o The
holder would be able to unfairly pick and choose; the holder could
mislead the listener by selectively disclosing favorable communications while invoking the privilege to defensively suppress unfavorable communications.31
The courts and commentators have described the subject-matter
waiver rule as the traditional prevailing doctrine. For its part, the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers asserts that the gen-

eral rule applies to "nontestimonial setting[s]" such as business
negotiations. 32 A Restatement comment states that a "clear majority of decisions" support that position. One such decision was
Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Freestar Bank, N.A.

There, before any

threat of litigation, the holder's president disclosed a privileged,
April 13, 2006 letter to an employee of a marketing firm with
whom the privilege-holder consulted regarding an organizational
name change.3 4 The court ruled that "disclosing the April 13
letter ... effectuated a waiver of the attorney client privilege as to
that document and to any other documents of the same subject
matter."3 Likewise, in United States of America v. South Chicago
Bank,36 a holder bank disclosed a privileged note to the year-end
audit team. The court held that the waiver extended to other re28. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:81 n.2 (citing In re Assoc. Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743,
744 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)).
29. See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 586.
30. Id. at 508, 517, 531, 540, 543; Martin et al., supra note 20, at 431-32; RICE, supra
note 24, § 9:79, § 9:81; CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5:30, at
400 n.7 (4th ed. 2009); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 507-08 (the holder should not be
able to have his or her cake and eat it).
31. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:81.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 cmt. f ("If partial
disclosure occurs in a nontestimonial setting or in the context of pretrial discovery, a clear
majority of decisions indicates that a similar broad [subject-matter] waiver will be found,
even though the disclosure is not intended to obtain advantage as a possibly misleading
halftruth in testimony.").
33. Id. In Center Partners,Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, No. 113107, 2012 Ill. LEXIS
1525 (Ill. Nov. 29, 2012), the court listed several cases, including FlagstarBank, FSB v.
Freestar Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 2706965, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76842 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25,
2009), that adopt this view.
34. Flagstar,2009 WL 2706965.
35. Id. at *6.
36. 1998 WL 774001, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17445 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1998).
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lated notes and commented that "[ulnder the doctrine of partial
waiver, the disclosure of part of a privileged document or a set of
such waives the privilege as to the rest of it."3 7
B.

The Contrary View that in the Business Negotiation Setting,
the Scope of the Waiver Is GenerallyLimited to the Disclosed
Communications

As the Introduction pointed out, although the subject-matter
waiver rule is the traditional rule, there is now a good deal of case
law refusing to extend the rule to waivers made during business
negotiations. In recent years, the general trend has been to restrict subject-matter waivers." More specifically, the courts have
tended to confine the subject-matter waiver rule to the litigation
setting and to restrict the scope of extrajudicial waivers to the disclosure itself." One court adopting this limitation commented
that a uniform view is emerging;4 0 after surveying the precedents,
the court remarked that "[v]irtually every reported instance of an
implied waiver extending to an entire subject matter involves a. .
. disclosure made in the course of a judicial proceeding."4 When
the disclosure occurs in a setting "far removed from court,"4 2 there
is a growing4 3 trend44 to limit the scope of the waiver to only what
"was actually disclosed."45
These courts believe that there is a qualitative difference between the litigation and business negotiation settings.4 6 Like the
37. Id. at *3.
38. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 5:28, at 393.
39. Gregory P. Joseph, Privilege Waiver Rule I, NAT'L L.J., May 8, 2006, at 15 (citing
Joe Doe Co. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 350 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2003);
XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 2003)); Paul
R. Rice, A Gap in the PrivilegeThis Time, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at 26.
40. XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.
2003).
41. Id.; Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, No. 113107, 2012 Ill. LEXIS 1525
(111. Nov. 29, 2012).
42. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 5:28, at 385.
43. Id. § 5:33.
44. Id. § 5:28, at 393.
45. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:93.
46. Barry Tarlow, Running the Rapids: Subpoenas for Confidential Information, THE
CHAMPION, Aug. 2005, at 55, 60. (discussing XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of
the Records), 348 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2003) and stating, in relevant part, that the "[the court
observed a 'qualitative difference' between seeking to gain advantage in judicial proceedings and engaging in business negotiations" since in litigation, the court is more likely to
conclude that, at least in part, the opponent made the prior disclosure to gain a tactical
advantage).
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proponents of the extension of the subject-matter waiver rule to
negotiations, the opponents have presented multiple arguments.
To begin, they argue that a holder's partial disclosure during
business negotiations poses less risk of unfairness to the other
party.47 They claim that in the negotiation context, there is less
danger that the holder has made a partial revelation for manipulative, tactical reasons." In addition, as the Introduction noted,
they contend that the application of the subject-matter waiver rule
to negotiations pressures lay clients to forbid their attorneys from
actively participating in the negotiations; the clients will supposedly have a "perverse incentive[] .

.

. [to] leave attorneys out of

commercial negotiations for fear that their inclusion would later
force wholesale disclosure of confidential information."" Ultimately, they say, the application of the subject matter waiver rule
"would in effect destroy the [attorney-client] privilege" in business
negotiations.o
C.

The Compromise View

Although most jurisdictions subscribe to one of the two competing views discussed above, there is a compromise position. The
courts adopting the compromise position generally follow the view
that extrajudicial disclosure does not effect a subject-matter waiver. Two cases are illustrative. In re von Bulow is a case on
point." After a notorious murder trial, one of the defense attorneys, Professor Alan Dershowitz, wrote .a book about the case.5 2
With the permission of the client, Claus von Bulow, Dershowitz
disclosed certain privileged communications in the book. However, a court later ruled that the resulting waiver applied only to the
publicly disclosed matters. The court explained:
Although it is true that disclosures in the public arena may be
"one-sided" or "misleading," as long as such are and remain
extrajudicial, there is no legal prejudice that warrants a broad
47. In re Consolidated Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel,
1987 WL 20408, at *6 (N.D. Il1. Nov. 20, 1987).
48. See generally Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore &
Milnamow, Ltd., 1995 WL 360590, at *8, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8157 (N.D. M. June 14,
1995).
49. XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 24.
50. Id. at n.2; Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LLC, No. 113107, 2012 Ill.
LEXIS 1525 (Ill. Nov. 29, 2012).
51. 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987).
52.

ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INSIDE THE VONBOLOW CASE (1986).
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court-imposed subject matter waiver. The reason is that disclosures made in public rather than in court-even if selectivecreate no risk of legal prejudice until put at issue in the litigation by the privilege-holder.5 3
Similarly, when presented with an alleged waiver stemming
from a "News Release," the Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. v.
General Scanning, Inc. court professed that it could not see how
"past disclosure, standing alone, would cause any prejudice in this
litigation to [Electro Scientific Industries]", the party seeking disclosure. " "It follows that as long as [the privilege holder] does not
try to use in this litigation the sentence in the 'News Release' that
discloses the communication from counsel, the scope of the waiver
should be narrow." " However, when the extrajudicial meeting is
closely connected to litigation, these courts follow the traditional
subject-matter waiver rule. Thus, the court invoked the traditional rule in Pensacola Firefighters' Relief Pension Fund Board of
Trustees v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc." The court
reasoned that although the disclosure did not occur during litigation, it was motivated by a desire to avoid litigation."
II. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE MERITS OF THE COMPETING
VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE SUBJECTMATTER WAIVER RULE TO BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS

The crucial issue underlying the split of authority is whether, as
a matter of policy, it is justifiable to treat the litigation and business negotiation settings differently. As Part I.B indicated, the
opponents of extending the subject-matter waiver rule to negotiations have presented three arguments for distinguishing the two
settings.

53. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 103; EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 594.
54. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Scanning, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 539, 543-44 (N.D.
Cal. 1997), aff'd, 247 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 543; RIcE, supra note 24, § 9:81.
56. 265 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
57. Id. at 596.

Winter 2013
A.

Attorney-Client Privilege

177

A PartialDisclosure DuringBusiness NegotiationsDoes Not
Present the Same Risk of Prejudiceto the Opponent as a
PartialDisclosureDuringLitigation

The von Bulow court voiced this argument when it asserted that
partial extrajudicial disclosure cannot cause "legal prejudice" to
the opponent unless and until the holder "put[s] [the communication] at issue in [later] litigation."" The court used the adjective
"legal" advisedly. Although this argument employs a technical,
legal sense of "prejudice," common sense suggests that even a partial extrajudicial disclosure can cause the opponent severe actual
evidentiary and economic prejudice.
Suppose that although the disclosed information is favorable to
the holder, the related undisclosed information includes communications that would be devastating to the holder's case in subsequent litigation. Even the courts resisting the application of the
subject-matter waiver rule to business negotiations concede that
the traditional view governs the effect of disclosures occurring
during litigation. Thus, if the selective disclosure is made during
litigation, the opponent can defeat the privilege claim and obtain
the information that will lead to the holder's loss at trial. However, positing the limitation of the subject-matter waiver rule to litigation, if the opponent discloses the identical information during
business negotiations, there will be no subject-matter waiver.
Consequently, the opponent will be denied discovery of the undisclosed information, and the holder may win a wrongful verdict.
That wrongful verdict amounts to genuine prejudice. As this hypothetical illustrates, the timing of the disclosure has no effect on
the existence or extent of the evidentiary prejudice to the opponent.
Assume, alternatively, that the negotiations never lead to litigation. During negotiations, the holder's misleadingly incomplete
disclosure prompts the opponent to agree to a contract term that
costs the opponent $1,000,000. What if the judge permitted the
holder to make the same partial disclosure during litigation without being required to reveal related communications that would be
devastating to the holder's case? Denied the related communications, the opponent might be unable to prevail on a $1,000,000
cause of action. Here, too, the opponent suffers real prejudice and,
58. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987); Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth
Head GP, LLC, No. 113107, 2012 Ill. LEXIS 1525 (I. Nov. 29, 2012).

178

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 51

again, the timing of the disclosure has no effect on the degree of
the economic prejudice to the opponent.
As the Introduction pointed out, unlike other doctrinal areas in
evidence such as authentication and hearsay, privilege law is not
inspired by the legal system's institutional concern about the reliability of testimony. Rather, privilege law affects "extrinsic social
policy."" If any area of law should be shaped by practical concerns, it is privilege law. In an analysis of privilege doctrine, it is
wrong-minded to myopically focus on "legal" prejudice. Like a
partial judicial disclosure, a selective extrajudicial disclosure during business negotiations can cause the opponent real world evidentiary and economic prejudice. In short, the first proposed justification for the distinction between judicial and extrajudicial disclosures cannot withstand scrutiny."
B.

Unlike a PartialDisclosure DuringLitigation,a Partial
Disclosure DuringBusiness Negotiations Cannot Enable the
Holder to Gain an UnfairTactical Advantage

This proposed justification for the differential treatment of judicial and extrajudicial disclosures is a variation of the prior justification. Although the first argument is generally phrased in terms
of "legal prejudice," this argument identifies a more specific type
of prejudice, that is, an unfair tactical advantage gained against
the opponent.
The courts and commentators favoring the differential treatment of judicial and extrajudicial disclosures have frequently relied on this argument." It is certainly true that counsel sometimes use selective disclosures in litigation in an attempt to obtain
tactical advantage.6 2 Such disclosures can impede "the truth-

59. WIGMORE, supra note 2.
60. James P. McLoughlin, Jr., Neil T. Bloomfield, Renee D.K Miller & Tonya L. Mercer, Navigating Implied Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege After Adoption of Federal
Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURY. AM. L. 693, 740-41 (2012).
61. See, e.g., United States v. S. Chi. Bank, 1998 WL 774001, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30,
1998) ("defendants did not gain a strategic advantage . .. by selectively disclosing interview
information, extrajudicially, to the FDIC or its insurer").
62. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:81, at n.4 (citing In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Donovan v. Robbins, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11721, at *12-13 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 18, 1983) (stating that "[iut is a recognized principle that a party may not selectively
waive the attorney-client privilege so as to create a false and distorted impression of the
nature or content of a communication or series of communications between the attorney
and client.")).
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seeking process" of litigation.6 3 Based on this reasoning, courts
have applied the subject-matter waiver rule to waivers effected by
testimony during depositions' and at trial." These courts view
the rule as an antidote for unfair litigation tactics.
As Part I.C noted, some jurisdictions do not apply the rule to
public disclosures of privileged information such as the revelations
in the attorney's book in von Bulow." In that situation, it strains
the facts to claim that either the attorney or the client consenting
to the revelation was endeavoring to achieve any tactical advantage. It would be silly to suggest that Professor Dershowitz
was striving for some advantage over the publisher or that Claus
von Bulow was maneuvering for advantage against the readers.
In this setting, it is hard to conceive how selective disclosure could
result in any identifiable prejudice or unfairness.
However, the business negotiation setting is distinguishable.
The parallels between business negotiation and litigation are
striking. In negotiation, as in litigation, there are at least two
sides. In negotiation, as in litigation, each side is pursuing its
self-serving purposes." "Bargaining, like the litigation itself, partakes of the adversary procedure."" Like litigants, parties engaged in business negotiations commonly jockey for tactical advantage. Most importantly, like a selective disclosure in litigation,
a partial disclosure during negotiations can result in unfairness to
the opponent. When a plaintiffs incomplete disclosure misleads a
defendant into abandoning a meritorious affirmative defense,
there is undeniably a species of unfairness to the defendant.
However, unfairness can take other forms, as it may in business
negotiation.
One form of such unfairness can occur when a holder makes a
partial disclosure that is a half-truth, causing the other party to
63. XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.
2003).
64. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury January 246, 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Il. App. Ct. 1995)
(deposition).
65. See, e.g., People v. O'Connor, 345 N.E.2d 520, 523-24 (111. App. Ct. 1976) (trial testimony).
66. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 594, (discussing In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102-03
(2d Cir. 1987)).
67. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:81, at n.2, (citing Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538
F. Supp. 977, 979 (D. Del. 1982), affd, 758 F.2d 668 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("self-serving purposes"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985)); see also XYZ Corp., 348 F.3d at 23 ("for personal
benefit").
68. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:93, at n.10 (quoting Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. ImocoGateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 458 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976)).
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the bargaining process to agree to a contract term that it otherwise would have rejected. In economic terms, that unfairness can
be just as costly to the opponent as a selective litigation disclosure
that prompts a defendant to abandon a valid affirmative defense.
If anything, the law should be more concerned about preventing
such unfairness in the bargaining context. In the litigation setting, the opponent will almost always be represented by a lawyer
who may suspect that the disclosure is incomplete. In litigation,
the opponent's lawyer is in a position to expose the selective disclosure and prevent the unfairness. However, the opponent may
not be represented by counsel at the bargaining table. In short, in
the bargaining setting there is a greater risk that the holder's attempt to mislead the opponent will succeed and cause the opponent a substantial economic loss. Significantly, the Comment to
American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6
indicates that the exceptions to the attorney's confidentiality duty
can come into play in "negotiation" as well as "litigation."
For that matter, a pretrial selective disclosure during bargaining can cause unfairness in subsequent litigation even if the disclosure is not repeated during the litigation. Some opinions refusing to apply the subject-matter waiver rule seem to assume that a
partial disclosure cannot cause "legal prejudice" unless the disclosure is reiterated during the litigation." However, that assumption is false. Suppose, for example, that during pretrial business
negotiations, the holder makes a misleadingly incomplete disclosure. Assume further that the parties later fall out and that litigation ensues. Finally, assume that the holder does not repeat the
selective disclosure during the litigation. It is nevertheless possible that in shaping his or her trial strategy, the opponent might
mistakenly rely on the holder's earlier selective disclosure."
There is nothing magical about the timing of the selective disclosure; whether it occurred before or during litigation, the opponent
might detrimentally rely on it72 and consequently adopt a less effective trial strategy. In sum, the second proposed justification for
the differential treatment of litigation disclosures and extrajudicial bargaining disclosures is flawed.
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 7 (2011).
70. In re von Bulow, 828 F.3d at 103 ("[Dlisclosures made in public rather than in
court-even if selective-create no risk of legal prejudice until put at issue in the litigation
by the privilege-holder.")
71. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.12.7, at 1122.
72. See id.
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The Application of the Subject-Matter Waiver Rule to
Commercial Negotiations PressuresClients to Conduct the
Negotiations Without the Benefit of Counsel

As the Introduction pointed out, the primary argument against
extending the subject-matter waiver rule to commercial negotiations has been the contention that the application of the rule in
that setting gives clients a "perverse incentive[] .

.

. [to] leave at-

torneys out of commercial negotiations for fear that their inclusion
would later force wholesale disclosure of confidential information."" The advocates of this contention make the rhetorical,
dire prediction that the application of the rule "would in effect destroy the privilege" in business negotiations.74 In truth, that prediction is a gross exaggeration, reflecting misconceptions about
both the negotiation process and privilege law.
Before a court could find any waiver during negotiations and
then invoke the subject matter waiver rule, there would have to be
some discussion of the holder's legal position during the negotiations. In many cases, there is no such discussion. The holder often does not consult with an attorney to obtain legal arguments to
employ during the negotiations. Rather, in light of the relevant
tax or securities law, the holder simply wants to know what contract terms he or she should seek during negotiation in order to
maximize his or her profits from the transaction. The holder frequently has the economic leverage to demand the term. The holder's communications with his or her attorney explain why the
holder is insisting on the contract term, but given the holder's superior economic bargaining position, there will be no need for the
holder to advance any legal arguments during the negotiations. If
so, there is no occasion to disclose any protected attorney-client
communications during the negotiations. If there is no disclosure
at all," there is no waiver, and the court never reaches the issue of
the scope of the waiver.
73. XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.
2003).
74. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 n.2 (D. Del. 1968).
75. Pallares v. Kohn (In re Chevron), 650 F.3d 276, 290 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that if
the holder does not disclose any privileged information, then there can be no waiver); W.
United Life Assurance Co. v. Fifth Third Bank, 2004 WL 2583916, at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23073 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2004) ("In the first instance, there must be a disclosure of
part of a privileged communication; if no privileged information is disclosed, there can be
no 'partial waiver."'); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Autotech Corp., 1989 WL 134500, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 11, 1989) ("In short, waiver cannot stem from an unprivileged communication.").
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Alternatively, assume that the parties have relatively equal
economic bargaining power and that the holder/client may want to
present a legal argument as a justification for seeking a particular
contract term during the negotiations. Even on that assumption,
that application of the subject-matter waiver rule will not drive
attorneys from the bargaining table. As we shall now see, the application of the rule actually heightens the need for the client to
have his or her attorney at the table.
1.

The Client'sRole in Commercial Bargaining

If the client can no longer safely have the attorney sit at the negotiating table, the client will have to conduct the negotiations;
and if the need arises, it will be the client presenting the legal argument for the contract term. How great is the risk of a waiver
when the client does so?
On the one hand, the client may make several types of references to his or her consultation with the attorney without waiving
the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege protects only "communications" between the client and attorney.
The client has disclosed a protected "communication" only if the
client refers to the substance of the communication between the
client and the attorney.77 Given the definition of "communication"
in privilege law, the client may refer to the following facts without
losing the privilege: There was a communication; more specifically, at a particular place and time certain parties engaged in a
communication; and, even beyond that, the communication related
to a certain general topic such as "tax law."" None of these
statements by the client would forfeit the protection of the privilege because none of them discloses the substantive content of a
privileged attorney-client communication."
On the other hand, a court would probably conclude that even if
the client does not expressly refer to communications exchanged
76. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.7.
77. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 536-37 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litig., 1995 WL 531805, at *1-2, *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 1995)).
78. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.7.1, at 730.
79. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 5:28, at 386-87 ("Waiver does not occur
merely because a client discusses with others the same facts that she earlier discussed with
the attorney but only where she reveals the substance of the attorney-client communications . . . . A client's statement that she discussed the subject with her attorney does not
waive the privilege for the contents or substance of what she told her lawyer."); see also
RICE, supra note 24, § 9:85 (quoting Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62
F.R.D. 454, 458 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976)).
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between the client and attorney, the client waived the privilege by
describing the legal argument that the attorney conveyed to the
client. The court's reasoning in reaching this conclusion would
likely involve two steps.
The first step entails the realization that modernly, the attorney-client privilege applies to the attorney's statements to the client as well as the client's statements to the attorney.80 At early
common law, some courts applied the privilege only to the client's
statements conveying facts to the attorney." Today, however, the
privilege functions as a two-way street, also protecting the attorney's statements conveying legal advice to the client." One of the
last holdouts on this issue was Pennsylvania, but in early 2011
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relented and joined the ranks of
the courts shielding the attorney's statements to the client.
The second step is appreciating that the definition of "communication" includes knowledge based on privileged communications.84
The leading precedent is the United States Supreme Court's 1951
decision in Blau v. United States." A grand witness's spouse had
hidden herself to avoid service of a subpoena. The grand jury demanded that the witness reveal his knowledge of his wife's whereabouts. He refused on the ground that the basis for his knowledge
was a confidential spousal communication." The Court held that
the witness's refusal to answer was lawful. In the Court's words,
"liltis not disputed in the present case that petitioner obtained his
knowledge as to where his wife was by communication from her.""
Thus, a person's knowledge is treated as privileged if the
knowledge rests squarely on privileged communications.
Apply that reasoning to the client's presentation of a legal argument during a negotiation session in the attorney's absence.
The attorney may not be present but because the client lacks legal
training, the client is implicitly relying on the attorney's communications to the client." Those communications are the basis for
the client's statements about the legal argument during the nego80.

1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5,

81. Id. § 6.6.4, at 685.

§ 6.6.4, at 686.

82. See id.
83. Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 59 (Pa. 2011).
84. See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.6.7, at 712-14.
85. 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951).
86. Id. at 333.
87. Id.
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
("[A] person untrained in the law").

§

68 cmt. c (2000)
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tiation. The attorney's communications serve as the basis for the
client's understanding of the law," just as Blau's wife's communication to him was the basis for his knowledge of her whereabouts.
Since the contemporary privilege applies to the attorney's statements to the client, the client waives the privilege during bargaining when he or she makes the legal argument taught the client by
the attorney's statements. The waiver does not require an explicit reference to the attorney's statements since, like the statements,
the client's knowledge based on the statements is privileged. In
such circumstances, there is an implied waiver;" it results even if
the holder did not subjectively intend to surrender the privilege."
The upshot is that if the client needs to advance a legal argument
for a contract term during negotiations and attempts to present
that argument in the attorney's absence, there is a grave risk that
the client's statements about the legal argument will effect a
waiver.
2.

The Attorney's Role in Commercial Bargaining

As previously stated, the opponents of applying the subjectmatter waiver rule to business negotiations contend that applying
the rule in that setting pressures the client to "leave attorneys out
of commercial negotiations for fear that their inclusion would later
force wholesale disclosure of confidential information."92 That contention rests on a fundamental misconception about the definition
of "communication" in privilege law.93
In contrast to the client, during business negotiations the attorney can present the client's legal position in detail without waiv89. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 5:30, at 401 n.15 (citing United States v.
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (using the phrase "the basis for his understanding of what the law required"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 813 (1991)).
90. See RICE, supra note 24, at § 9:24.
91. Id. § 9:81 n.2 (citing First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim,
Appel, Dixon & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 30, § 5:28, at 387 n.21, (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604
F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Sea Land Serv., Inc. v. United States,
444 U.S. 915 (1979)).
92. XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.3d 16, 24-25 (1st
Cir. 2003).
93. Quite apart from the privilege analysis, as a matter of history this contention is
curious. As Part I notes, although there are recent authorities refusing to extend the subject matter waiver rule to business negotiations, the rule is the traditional view. See supra
Part I.A. The major role that attorneys currently play in business negotiations presumably
evolved while the traditional rule was dominant. If the dominance of that view did not
prevent the attorney's role from developing, it is difficult to understand how continued
recognition of the traditional rule will drastically curtail that role.
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ing the privilege." Neither the factual nor the legal component of
the attorney's presentation entails a divulgence of privileged information. Although the attorney's legal argument during the
negotiations will be premised on certain facts, ordinarily the attorney's reliance on that premise will not effect a waiver. Facts do
not constitute privileged information." As the Supreme Court has
underscored, "the protection of the [attorney-client] privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing
and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different
thing." Admittedly, immediately after the initial client interview
and before the bargaining session, the attorney's position is analogous to Blau's position before the grand jury. In Blau, the sole
basis for the husband's knowledge of his wife's whereabouts was a
confidential communication from his wife." Similarly, before the
attorney has had any opportunity to confirm the facts the client
stated in the very first client interview, the basis for the attorney's
knowledge of the facts is confidential communication from the client. However, by the time of the subsequent negotiation session,
the attorney has almost always corroborated the client's statements about the facts; at that point in the chronology, the attorney's knowledge of the facts no longer rests solely or even primarily on confidential communications from the client." For that matter, to be persuasive to the opponent during the bargaining session, the attorney's legal argument will have to be based on facts
known to the opponent. The opponent is unlikely to be persuaded
by a legal argument premised on facts the attorney is unwilling to
disclose to the opponent. As a practical matter, the attorney's argument must be predicated on facts accessible to the opponent;

94. See, e.g., Am. Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 1972)
(rejecting the argument that "a party waives its privilege if its lawyer, bargaining on its
behalf, contends vigorously and even in some detail that the law favors his client's position
on a point in issue"); RICE, supra note 24, § 9:93.
95. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.7.1, at 729.
96. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (quoting Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Magill v. Superior Court,
103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (nothing that "privilege does not protect
disclosure of underlying facts"). "The client cannot be compelled to answer the question,
'What did you say or write to the attorney?,' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant
fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his
communication to his attorney." Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Phliadelphia,205 F.
Supp. at 831).
97. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951).
98. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 29, § 5:28, at 386. In some cases, the client
may call his or her attorney as a fact witness at trial without waiving the privilege. Id.
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and if the facts are accessible in that fashion, the attorney's implicit reliance on the facts cannot effect a waiver.
Nor does the attorney's description of the legal component of the
argument entail a waiver of any privileged attorney. Lacking legal training, the client must implicitly draw on the attorney's
communications about the law to present the legal argument to
the opponent during the bargaining session. However, precisely
because he or she possesses legal training, the lawyer has no need
to rely on any communications from the client about the law. The
lawyer is drawing on his or her own legal research and analysis.
It is therefore clear that in the typical bargaining session, the attorney may present the client's legal argument for a desired contract term without forfeiting the client's privilege." On a moment's reflection, it would be shocking to find a waiver here. Every day in trial and appellate courts throughout the United States,
attorneys stand up and describe in detail their client's legal position on the facts before the court. No one could seriously suggest
that by making those arguments, the attorneys were waiving their
clients' attorney-client privilege. The wording of the attorney's
description of the client's legal argument during a bargaining session could be identical to the later description of the argument to a
trial or appellate judge. If the attorney's presentation of the argument in court does not effect a waiver, the attorney's explanation of the identical argument at the bargaining table should not
have that effect.
There are, of course, exceptional cases in which an attorney's
statement during bargaining can result in a waiver. Suppose, for
example, that after the attorney initially described the client's legal argument in a bargaining session, the opponent states, "You
say that now. But I doubt whether you would have taken that
position a month ago before the value of your client's stock declined." To respond to that statement, with the client's authorization, the attorney might disclose a prior communication between
the attorney and client such as a letter written two months earlier
in which the lawyer outlined the same argument presented during
99. RICE, supra note 24, at § 9:93. "If... an attorney makes a detailed explanation of a
legal matter during negotiations in an effort to convince the adversary about the merits of
his client's cause, that does not waive the privilege." Id.; see also Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.
v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 2001 WL 699889, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 26, 2001) ("Defendants seem
to be arguing that when a lawyer talks with an adverse party about an issue, that conversation might have 'divulged the content' of the lawyer's private, privileged documents on
the same subject so as to waive applicable privileges. That theory is a non-starter.").
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the bargaining session. The attorney might do so to enhance the
credibility of the client's bargaining position;oo the letter shows
that the attorney advocated the same analysis even before the
stock decline. In this variation of the fact situation, the attorney
has not only described the client's current legal position on the
issue; the attorney has also disclosed a prior, privileged attorneyclient communication.
On these facts, the court should find a
0
waiver.' o However, that is a rare case, and in the run-of-the-mill
bargaining session, the attorney can explain the client's present
legal argument in depth without forfeiting the client's privilege.
In summary, when the client needs to present a legal argument
at the bargaining table to justify a desired contract term, it is
much safer for the client to call on the attorney to make the
presentation. If the client himself or herself were to do so, there
would be a substantial risk of an implied waiver; the client will
almost necessarily be relying on confidential communications from
the attorney. That risk declines markedly when the attorney presents the legal argument. Since the attorney is familiar with evidence law, he or she is much more likely to know whether a particular statement will effect a waiver. Furthermore, as we have
seen, under Blau there is much less likelihood that the court will
find that a waiver has been implied from the attorney's statements explaining the legal argument. Of course, the possible application of the subject-matter waiver rule significantly increases
the stakes.
If there is a waiver and the court applies the subject-matter
waiver rule, the extent of the waiver will usually include not only
the disclosed information but at least some previously undisclosed,
potentially damaging communications.1 02 The possibility of the
court's invocation of the subject-matter waiver rule gives the client
100. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:93.
101. Id.
102. Although in most cases the application of the subject-matter waiver rule will increase the volume of information disclosed to the party seeking discovery, the application of
the rule does not invariably lead to the result that the party gains additional information.
To be discoverable, the communication must at least be relevant. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 5, § 6.12.7, at 1112-13. Unless a client relies on an advice of counsel defense, the attorney's statements to the client may be irrelevant. See LID Assoc. v. Dolan, 324 Ill. App.
3d 1047, 1058-60, 756 N.E.2d 866, appeal denied, 197 Ill.2d 564, 763 N.E.2d 771 (2001)
(allow a real estate lawyer to testify to his view of the scope of fiduciary duties owed to the
plaintiff limited partners was deemed irrelevant). Unless under the substantive law it is
for some reason relevant to show the attorney's or client's belief about the state of the law,
attorney-client communications may be irrelevant. In the typical case, the legal determinant is the view of the presiding judge, not that of a litigant or the litigant's attorney.
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all the more reason to assign the attorney the task of describing
the client's legal argument during the bargaining session. Assigning that task to the attorney minimizes the risk of a waiver and
will hopefully moot the issue of the application of the subjectmatter waiver rule. Hence, rather than threatening to banish the
attorney from the bargaining table, the subject-matter waiver rule
gives the client a much stronger incentive to give his or her attorney both a seat at the table and a large role in the negotiations.
To borrow a phrase from a Fifth Circuit decision on expert testimony, the prediction that the extension of the subject matter
waiver rule to commercial negotiations will drive attorneys from
the bargaining table is "exactly backwards."os
III. CONCLUSION

The point of this article is not to evaluate the wisdom of the subject-matter waiver rule. It is debatable whether the courts ought
to broadly define subject matter when they invoke the rule.104 As
Part I.A indicated, Dean Wigmore's advocacy of a broad definition
may have reflected his hostility to privileges that obstruct the
search for truth. Today there is a widespread public consensus
that personal privacy deserves additional protection,"o' and privileges are a means of affording such protection. A broad subjectmatter waiver rule certainly requires a more concrete justification
than the metaphysical notion of the indivisibility of a privilege.'
There has been a modern trend to limit the scope of subject-matter
waiverslo' and define subject matter more narrowly.10 8 Professor
Richard Marcus has constructed a strong case that rather than
purporting to rely on any definition of "subject matter," the courts
should employ a fairness test to determine the extent of a waiver.'0o In his view, the waiver ought to extend to the undisclosed
communications only if, without the context supplied by the undisclosed communications, the selective disclosure is likely to op-

103. Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997).
104. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.12.7, at 1113-19.
105. 1 id. § 1.1, at 5-6.
106. RICE, supra note 24, § 9:83.
107. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 30, § 5:28, at 393.
108. Id.
109. Richard Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1605, 1627 (1986); 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 5, § 6.12.7, at 1113-17 (discussing Professor
Marcus's view).
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erate as a misleading half-truth."o Professor Marcus's test prevents the holder from using a partial disclosure as a manipulative
tool to distort"' or garble1 l 2 the truth. When Congress enacted
new waiver rule in 2008, Congress decided to incorporate a fairness test in Rule 502(a)(3) to limit the scope of subject-matter
waivers.'
Rather, the point of this article is that if there is to be any subject-matter waiver rule, the rule should apply to waivers effected
in business negotiations as well as litigation. Some extrajudicial
waivers such as the revelations in the book in von Bulow" 4 are
highly unlikely to directly cause any prejudice or unfairness.
However, selective disclosures in business negotiations differ. Realistically, like litigation, negotiation is an adversarial setting.
Like incomplete litigation disclosures, partial disclosures during
negotiations can cause significant prejudice and result in unfairness. On close examination, the asserted differences between the
litigation and negotiation settings prove to be largely illusory; in
both settings selective disclosures can result in real prejudice, and
in both contexts parties can employ selective disclosures to maneuver for tactical advantage.
Finally, it is plainly wrong to predict that the application of the
subject-matter waiver rule to negotiations will prompt clients to
"leave attorneys out of commercial negotiations . . . ."ts If, in

counsel's absence, the client presents a legal argument for a desired contract term, there is a considerable risk that the client's
presentation will trigger a privilege waiver. That risk virtually
evaporates if, instead, the client relies on the attorney to present
the legal argument during negotiations. The prospect of a subjectmatter waiver gives the client a powerful motivation to have counsel present to explain the client's legal argument. Thus, rather
than imperiling the attorney's role in business negotiations, the
subject-matter waiver rule secures counsel's prominent place at
the bargaining table.

110. Marcus, supra note 109, at 1628.
111. See, e.g., RICE, supra note 24, § 9:81, at n.4 (citing Donovan v. Robbins, 588 F.
Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
112. EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 589.
113. FED. R. EVID. 502.
114. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101-04 (2d Cir. 1987).
115. XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.
2003).

